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Our thematic collection relates to the nature of young infants’ representation in spe-
cific situations involving occluded objects. Piaget (1954) concluded that the infant
has no representations at this age. Most now agree that conclusion was unwar-
ranted, but researchers differ as to what, if any, representations exist of occluded
objects (Baillargeon, 1993, 1995; Bogartz, Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997; Haith,
1988; Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet, & Scholl, 1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998).
Obviously, issues concerning the nature of infant representation must be de-
cided experimentally. It is therefore important to know how much confidence can
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be placed in the existing studies, especially those supporting more extreme posi-
tions. This exchange regarding the larger theoretical issues takes place in the con-
text of assessing the nature and importance of evidence from the drawbridge
experiments in general and the frequently cited Baillargeon, Spelke, and
Wasserman (1985) study in particular. Here, we respond to the remarks made by
Baillargeon (this issue), Aslin (this issue), and Munakata (this issue).
BAILLARGEON’S COMMENTS
Habituation and Impossibility
Baillargeon (this issue) suggested that habituation to the impossible event confuses
the infants, but no reason is given why they should be confused. It is also unclear in
what way they should respond differently if they are confused. For example, would
Baillargeon predict that they should look longer or shorter? In any case, the data do
not support her suggestion. Neither Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (this issue)
nor Cashon and Cohen (this issue) found a difference on the habituation trials as a
function of the impossibility when there should have been longer (or perhaps
shorter) looking due to confusion.
An apparent inconsistency is that Baillargeon (this issue) claimed that infants
should be confused, distracted, and so on by the impossible event during habitua-
tion but claims no such confusion or distraction on the test trials, only surprise. She
gives no justification for why impossible events should confuse or distract infants
at the beginning of an experiment, but only surprise them after habituation.
Baillargeon (this issue) also suggested that habituation trials may not be needed.
But, if they are not needed, then habituation trials in the Event Set × Event Set de-
sign would be equivalent to test trials, and these trials show no difference between
possible and impossible events.
The Event Set × Event Set Method
Baillargeon (this issue) is correct that Oakes (1994) did use an Event Set ×
Event Set design in her study of infants’ causal perception. Oakes went beyond
merely asking whether infants distinguish between different categories because
theoretical questions were embedded in her use of the design. But, the Event Set
× Event Set design used by Oakes is not the Event Set × Event Set method (e.g.,
Bogartz et al., 1997). This new method entails mathematical modeling that en-
ables different models to be explicitly pitted against one another in the study of
infant perception and cognition. Specific hypotheses can be incorporated in the
form of specific parameters and tests concerning these parameters can be per-
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formed. Thus, the method goes well beyond simply using the same events for
both habituation and test.
Consistency of Results
Schilling’s (this issue) finding with 4-month-olds of a familiarity preference after 7
familiarization trials and a novelty preference after 12 familiarization trials is con-
sistent with the Bogartz et al. (this issue) finding with 5½-month-olds of a familiar-
ity preference after 3 trials and a novelty preference after 7 trials. Recall from
Hunter and Ames (1988) that younger infants require more trials than older infants
before they shift from a familiarity preference to a novelty preference. Also, poten-
tially consistent with this pattern is the finding by Baillargeon, Kotovsky, and
Needham (1995) that still older infants at 6½ months old prefer the impossible 180°
rotation after just one habituation trial but not after multiple habituation trials.
Using Habituation Trials
Baillargeon (this issue) claims that habituation trials are not essential. She admits
presenting limited exposure or familiarization trials in more recent studies. How-
ever, doing this may actually make it more likely that infants will respond to famil-
iarity. It is not surprising that she says long habituation phases can be “counterpro-
ductive.” This very well could increase the likelihood that infants would show a
novelty preference.
Habituators Versus Nonhabituators
Baillargeon (this issue) is surprised that Cashon and Cohen (this issue) gave their
infants up to 20 trials because “20 is a staggering number to use with older infants”
(p. 457). Twenty habituation trials is not at all a staggering number of trials to use in
a habituation study. Numerous studies have used that maximum. Furthermore, ap-
parently Baillargeon’s setting of the maximum number of habituation trials at 9 or
14 was not conservative enough—roughly 30% of her infants did not meet her ha-
bituation criterion (Baillargeon, 1987a, Experiments 2 and 3). Cashon and Cohen
wanted to ensure that as many infants as possible would fully habituate. The most
basic assumption of the experiment (i.e., after habituation, infants should prefer
novelty) depended on it. This is also the reason why Cashon and Cohen separated
the nonhabituators from the habituators.
To return to the issue of consistency, the fact that Cashon and Cohen (this issue)
found a familiarity effect with 8-month-old infants after up to 20 trials should not
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be seen as an inconsistency. Whether infants have been shown fewer familiariza-
tion trials (Baillargeon et al., 1995; Bogartz et al., this issue; Schilling, this issue)
or whether they never reached the habituation criterion, or did reach the criterion
but showed a preference for the familiar test trial (Cashon & Cohen, this issue), the
conclusion is the same. Infants who have not been fully habituated, and as a result
have a preference for the familiar rotation, appear to show a preference for the im-
possible test event.
Use of Animated Events by Cashon and Cohen
Many of Baillargeon’s (this issue) criticisms seem irrelevant given that the
nonhabituators in Cashon and Cohen’s (this issue) study tended to replicate her ma-
jor findings. Baillargeon (this study) suggested that computer-animated events may
have been impoverished perceptually, so that the infants could not interpret them.
Apparently, some animated events are appropriate given that Baillargeon (this is-
sue) is willing to include as supportive evidence results from Lécuyer, Abgueguen,
and Lemarié (1992), who also used animated events. We have not seen those events,
but it would be interesting to compare how realistic the events used by Lécuyer were
with those used by Cashon and Cohen. We believe the Cashon and Cohen stimuli,
which are on file as QuickTime movies at http://www.infancyarchives.com, were
quite realistic. However, readers can decide for themselves. Also, despite
Baillargeon’s (this issue) objections, Cashon and Cohen did in fact get results that
were highly consistent with theother studies in this thematic collection thatused real
objects.
Spurious Claims
Space limitations do not permit detailed refutation of several incorrect statements
by Baillargeon (this issue) concerning the Bogartz et al. (this issue) article and what
its authors believe. We discuss here just a few.
Baillargeon (this issue) claimed that Bogartz et al. (this issue) “apparently be-
lieve that the experiments of Kellman and Spelke (1983), Baillargeon et al. (1985),
and Baillargeon and Graber (1987) are the primary experiments to suggest that
young infants can represent occluded objects” (pp. 447–448). What Bogartz et al.
(this issue) actually said was “Some of the classic experiments (Baillargeon &
Graber, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1985; Kellman & Spelke, 1983) that have been
widely assumed to demonstrate young infant representation of the occluded object
have been recently receiving experimental attention and consideration of alterna-
tive interpretations” (p. 426). Clearly, we referred to those three experiments as
some of the support and not as the primary experiments. They simply happen to be
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the ones addressed first. One must begin somewhere. Baillargeon (this issue) had
no basis for her statement that Bogartz et al. (this issue) fail to appreciate that there
are many studies suggesting that young infants can represent occluded objects.
Baillargeon (this issue) claimed that Bogartz et al. (this issue) “believe that their
experiments contain replications of the experimental and control conditions in
Baillargeon et al. (1985)” (p. 450). We actually said that the experimental result
was replicated (not the procedure or the control group) in the sense that the infants
with a familiarity preference looked longer at the impossible event, as in
Baillargeon et al. (1985). In context, our remarks are unambiguous and correct.
In general, Baillargeon (this issue) mischaracterizes Bogartz et al. (this issue) as
questioning object permanence in young infants based on a limited awareness of
the literature. Actually, Bogartz et al. (this issue) believed that their article was not
the appropriate venue for the detailed treatment of numerous studies. We refer
Baillargeon to Meltzoff and Moore (1998), who also consider Baillargeon and
Graber (1987) and Baillargeon et al. (1985) to be important exemplars of literature
taken to support object permanence, and who, after reviewing a variety of studies,
conclude that object permanence does not occur in young infants.
ASLIN’S COMMENTS
Aslin (this issue) says that the design and interpretation of the experiments reported
by Baillargeon et al. (1985) were impeccable. We believe that is a bit of an over-
statement. Here we look more closely at aspects of the Baillargeon et al. design,
analysis, and results.
Experimental Design
Even if one were to accept the adequacy of the control experiment, and assume it
controlled for the fact that impossibility is confounded with familiarity and con-
founded with the greater amount of motion (Rivera, Wakeley, & Langer, 1999), the
design is still seriously flawed. The amount of screen rotation time it takes for the
same amount of the novel block to be exposed is also confounded with impossibil-
ity. On the impossible event, the block is occluded for 10 sec per cycle and visible
for 2 sec. On the possible event, the block is occluded for 6 sec and visible for 2 sec.
Their infants look for about 25 sec at the impossible event and 14.33 sec at the pos-
sible event. Thus, on the impossible trials, the infants, on average, look for about
2.08 screen rotation cycles, seeing the block for 4.16 sec; on the possible trials the
infants look about 1.83 cycles, seeing the block for about 3.66 sec. The difference is
about .25 cycles. The infants see the revealed novel block for about 4 sec in each
condition. The obtained difference in looking time could have been due to the lon-
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ger looking required on the impossible event trials to see the same amount of novel
block as could be seen with shorter looking on the possible event trials. Naturally,
this difference would not show up in the control experiment because the novel
block was always visible on both types of trials.
Baillargeon (1987a) did not replicate the motion timing used in Baillargeon et
al. (1985). Instead, a different confound was introduced. On the impossible events,
the screen was in motion during eight-tenths of each rotation cycle, but on the pos-
sible events it was in motion on only five-ninths of each cycle.
The Control Experiment
It is not clear that the control experiment was run at the same time as the principal
experiment. Infants were not assigned at random to one or the other of the two ex-
periments. Procedures may have subtly changed, the observers may have been dif-
ferent, and their criteria may have shifted. We have no measures of comparability
between the two experiments.
The control experiment is supposed to control for the simple effects of different
amounts of screen rotation in the possible and impossible events, and therefore
control against a screen rotation preference. We suggest that it did not. In
Baillargeon et al. (1985), the block, always visible to the side of the rotating
screen, may have distracted infants from the screen producing the lack of differ-
ence to the two rotations. Therefore, a better control condition for the effects of dif-
ferent amounts of screen rotation would be to test infants without a distracting
block. In fact, in the control conditions of Baillargeon (1987a), the block was not
present. However, another problem is created by that control. All infants were first
habituated to the longer rotation and then tested on the longer rotation and the
shorter rotation. Any initial preference for the longer rotation would be countered
by the fact that the infants were habituated to the longer rotation. A more appropri-
ate control would have been to counterbalance the two rotation events during ha-
bituation or even simpler, to test for a rotation preference without any prior
habituation. Rivera et al. (1999) did this in their second experiment and found a
preference for looking at the 180° rotation.
Statistical Analysis
In each study, repeated measure error terms were inappropriately pooled without
justification or prior test of homogeneity (Bogartz, 2000; Winer, Brown, &
Michels, 1991). Baillargeon et al. (1985) performed the crucial test using a pooled
error term with 83 df when the appropriate error term would have had 20 df. In Ex-
periment 1 of Baillargeon (1987a), an F that should have had 1 df and 22 df is re-
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ported as having 1 df and 126 df and in Experiment 2, F(1, 189) should have been
F(1, 35). A spurious increase in the error term degree of freedom inflates the size of
the F ratio by decreasing the denominator mean square while decreasing the size of
the F needed for significance.
Rivera et al. (1999) indicated that they “did not include infants who did not
complete all eight test trials so as to avoid having to analyze the data using a miss-
ing-data algorithm and potentially inflating the degrees of freedom” (p. 428). In
our opinion, this is what Baillargeon should have done.
Baillargeon (this issue) makes much of the failure by Bogartz et al. (this issue)
to give multiple trials on the test events. But, it is that very trials factor and its inter-
action with events that provides the extra spurious degree of freedom. In
Baillargeon (1987a, 1987b), she changed from three test trials to four. This made
incomplete data more likely, which would result in pooling of the error terms and
also of further increasing the number of degrees of freedom that would be incor-
rectly added.
The Results
Are the results as clean and neat as Aslin (this issue) and Baillargeon (this issue) sug-
gest?Riveraetal. (1999), indiscussing theresultsof theirExperiment1,noted that
The order effect (i.e., infants looked longer overall at the impossible 180° event only
when it was presented first) found, for example, by Baillargeon (1987a, 1987b) and
Baillargeon et al. (1985) was robustly found in our data as well … what is being found
is not a general preference. It is particular to one order, that is, a preference for 180°
rotations when they come before 112° rotations. (p. 431)
Butnote that theordereffect inBaillargeonet al. (1985)wasonly for thecontrol con-
dition,not theexperimental. Indiscussing theirExperiment2,Riveraetal. stated,
As in Experiment 1, we found a significant order effect. Specifically, only infants who
saw the 180° rotation first looked longer overall at the 180° rotations. Baillargeon et
al. (1985) reported a similar finding in their control study … Therefore we cannot ac-
cept Baillargeon’s (1987a) dismissal of the order effect as ‘theoretically uninterest-
ing.’ (p. 433)
Because order was balanced in Baillargeon (1987a, 1987b), only half of their in-
fants in the experimental conditions showed the claimed effect. In effect, the result
with the impossible event occurring on the first trial could not even be replicated by
Baillargeon (1987a, 1987b) using her own procedures, if the possible event oc-
curred first—a fragile result indeed.
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Aslin (this issue) ignored one third of the design in Bogartz et al.’s (this issue)
first experiment and one fourth of the design in Cashon and Cohen’s (this issue)
experiment (the infants who were habituated to the impossible event) by begging
the theoretical question at issue. Aslin claimed that habituating infants to impossi-
ble events asks the question “Can brief exposures to events that apparently violate
the physical principles of our environment … overcome the infant’s developmen-
tal history with ‘normal’ physical principles?” (p. 464). He believes this does not
relate to Baillargeon’s question in the drawbridge studies. But, of course, one of
the major issues to be tested is whether the infants are at all sensitive to these viola-
tions of what adults take to be physical principles.
Bogartz et al. (this issue) and Cashon and Cohen (this issue) found two critical
results by habituating the infants (between participants) to all of the stimulus
events used in Baillargeon et al. (1985) and not just to one of them. First, the in-
fants took no longer to habituate to the impossible event than to the possible event.
If the impossible event is violating a physical principle known to the infant, the in-
fant should be surprised, look longer, and take longer to habituate. This does not
occur. Baillargeon (this issue) suggested that habituation trials may not even be
needed. But, if they are not needed, then, as we mentioned earlier, the habituation
trials may be viewed as test trials and these test trials do not reveal longer looking
to the impossible event.
Second, Bogartz et al. (this issue) found symmetry in the table of means for the
test trial looking times. This result, also found repeatedly, shows that the mean
looking time to Event A following habituation to Event B is the same as the mean
looking time to Event B following habituation to Event A, regardless of which, if
either, of the events is possible or impossible. The result strongly suggests that the
looking time concerns a symmetrical relation between the stimulus event in per-
ception during the test trial and the stimulus event placed in memory during the ha-
bituation trials. This result has been noticed before (Rose, Jankowski, & Senior,
1997). The result is implied by the comparison theories used by Bogartz et al. (this
issue), Cashon and Cohen (this issue), Schilling (this issue), and Meltzoff and
Moore (1998). There is no obvious line of reasoning from the Baillargeon (this
issue) or Aslin (this issue) position that would imply this reliable result.
MUNAKATA’S COMMENTS
Munakata (this issue), although acknowledging the importance of our studies, sug-
gested that we failed to address a critical control condition, failed to replicate the
original findings, and mischaracterized conceptual accounts. We have already dis-
cussed the control condition at length. We respectfully disagree with Munakata in
that we believe that in each of the articles, we replicated the critical finding of lon-
ger looking at the impossible screen rotation. We agree that we did not replicate the
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exact experiments performed by Baillargeon et al. (1985), but we disagree as to
how crucial it is that we do so. See the discussion of replication that follows.
Pretesting With the To-Be-Hidden Block
Munakata (this issue) claims that in the original studies infants “first had to look at
the block for 2 sec before the event started,” says that none of our studies appeared
to apply this criterion, and then suggests why this may be critical (p. 474). We be-
lieve that Munakata is in error so far as the Baillargeon et al. (1985) study is con-
cerned. Baillargeon et al. indicated no such 2-sec look at the block in their descrip-
tion of the possible or impossible events. They did indicate that “After the
habituation phase, the yellow box was introduced into the front alley. Infants were
given two 3-sec pretest trials to call their attention to the presence of the box.”
Bogartz et al. (this issue) indicated that
When the computer signaled the end of the last habituation trial, the curtain dropped
and two pretest trials were presented. The pretest trials are included because they were
included in the experiment by Baillargeon et al. (1985). In the pretest trials, the curtain
was raised to reveal the red block standing alone. The screen lay flat against the floor
of the alley with the block clearly visible behind it. The curtain was dropped when the
infant had been judged to look at the block for 3 cumulative sec. (pp. 410–411)
Munakata’s claim that the infants may use the time before the drawbridge starts
moving to form predictions that allow them to recognize the impossibility of events
is an interesting conjecture, but it does not relate to a methodological difference be-
tween the Baillargeon et al. study and the Bogartz et al. (this issue) study.
Revisiting Baillargeon’s Control Condition
Munakata (this issue) argued that perceptual processing accounts cannot readily
explain the findings of the Baillargeon et al. (1985) control condition. We disagree.
There is evidence in Cashon and Cohen’s (this issue) nonhabituators’ analysis that
although infants did not look significantly differently at the two control condition
test events, there was a significant preference for the two longer rotating test events
over the two shorter rotating test events. In fact, Figure 4 of Cashon and Cohen
shows that, descriptively, the mean looking time at the 180 no block is longer than
the mean looking time at the 120 no block test event. In their original analysis as re-
ported in the article, this comparison was not significant. However, when they com-
pared the 180 no block mean to the 120 no block mean in a simple F test, the differ-
ence approached significance, F(1, 9) = 3.979, p < .08. That trend plus the failure to
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obtain a significant Block × Rotation effect all indicates that the nonhabituating in-
fants are showing a familiarity preference for the 180° rotation. Baillargeon et al.
(1985) failed to statistically analyze the data for a main effect of rotation across ex-
perimental and control conditions. Perhaps if she had, she too would have found an
overall preference for the longer rotation.
Conceptual Versus Perceptual Accounts
Finally, Munakata (this issue) suggested, without documentation, that a weakness
of our studies is that they mischaracterize conceptual accounts as positing only con-
ceptual factors, and suggested that proponents of conceptual accounts are in fact
concerned with the importance of familiarity. We disagree. First of all, in the Event
Set × Event Set method we set forth a model that allowed for both a conceptual fac-
tor and for factors involving relations between the habituation events and the test
events. In the largest model we considered, both types of factors could have played
a part. We did not claim that if both factors played a part, this would disprove the
conceptual account that allowed for only the conceptual factor, nor did we believe
this to be true. What we did say was that if the parameter representing the role of the
conceptual factor of impossibility did not contribute to description of the looking
times, this would be evidence against the conceptual account, and this is what we
found.
Our criticism of some approaches is not that familiarity is ignored but rather
that an automatic novelty preference is assumed for all participants so far as the
test events are concerned relative to the habituation or familiarization event.
Roder, Bushnell, and Sasseville (this issue) show unmistakably that infants do not
shift immediately into a novelty preference after exposure to an event but instead
that this is a gradual process and begins with a familiarity preference, supporting
our work. We believe that the Event Set × Event Set method provides an important
correction to this bias by allowing for novelty–familiarity preference to be as-
sessed for each infant rather than taken for granted to always be novelty prefer-
ence. Alternatively, one can use a strict habituation criterion and separate out
nonhabituators from habituators as Cashon and Cohen (this issue) did.
A FINAL WORD ON REPLICATION AND PARSIMONY
Baillargeon (this issue) asserts that our three articles fail to replicate her initial stud-
ies. In all three articles, we reported results that replicate the main finding in her
studies, albeit under certain circumstances. The key concern for the familiarity hy-
pothesis is under what conditions we replicated her findings. Under conditions in-
dicating a familiarity effect (either limited exposure or nonhabituators), we did rep-
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licate her findings. Under conditions suggesting a novelty effect, we did not
replicate. These results from all three laboratories undercut Baillargeon’s (1987a,
1987b; Baillargeon et al., 1985) basic assumption in these studies that if infants did
not know the event was impossible, they would prefer to look at the possible test
event because it was more novel. We found in all three laboratories that this as-
sumption is questionable. Were infants in her studies fully habituated and thus
“should” have had a preference for novelty? We believe we have demonstrated that
infants looked longer at the impossible event, not because it was impossible, but be-
cause they preferred the familiar rotation.
The reviewers make much of the procedural replication. Replication was im-
possible with respect to the Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon (1987a,
1987b) studies given that they varied among themselves. We did not set out to
replicate the procedures exactly. We felt that our manipulations fell into a rea-
sonable range in which the claimed phenomena should occur. We find the sug-
gested reasons why our procedures may have resulted in nonconceptual
approaches by the infants to be flimsy at best. Replication of the results was un-
likely in the light of the fragility of the results. Baillargeon (1987a, 1987b) her-
self could not replicate the result when she changed the order of the events on
the test trials to possible first.
Baillargeon (this issue) interpreted numerous studies as supporting the object per-
manence inference and suggested that this body of work must all be engaged at once if
the inference is to be doubted. Our approach has been more circumscribed. We agree
that the most satisfying conclusion will be when all of these studies are well under-
stood. We believe that considering one area at a time is the only practical way to go
about the empirical side of the matter. We share this approach with Rivera et al.
(1999), who also first approached the drawbridge work and then the arithmetic work.
(Baillargeon, this issue, correctly anticipated a failure to replicate the arithmetic work.
See Wakeley, Rivera, & Langer, in press.) For a broader, more encompassing ap-
proach that also rejects the object permanence claim, see Meltzoff and Moore (1998).
Baillargeon (this issue) argued that a “single coherent explanation of large bod-
ies of findings” (p. 448) is more parsimonious than separate post hoc explanations
for each individual experiment. We agree. But, just as the specific perceptual ex-
planations for each study vary across studies (as the objects and events differ), so
too does the specific conceptual knowledge that is supposedly demonstrated.
There are different conceptual explanations just as there are different perceptual
explanations. So, why is an explanation of different findings that is based on con-
ceptual processing any more parsimonious than an explanation based on lower
level perceptual processing? In fact, given either perceptual explanations or con-
ceptual explanations for a set of experiments, a lower level perceptual explanation
would appear to be more parsimonious. The perceptual explanation is clearly more
parsimonious if one includes in the set of studies to be explained the vast literature
on infant habituation, memory, attention, and perception.
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